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Analysis Doubts multiply about U.S. aid to Colombia
By THOMAS A. CARDAMONE
JR.
Sylvester Salcedo has seen firsthand both ends of the
international drug pipeline. As a Spanish teacher at a junior high school in
Roxbury, Mass., in the mid-1980s, he witnessed the lure that drugs have for
kids -- particularly the money they could earn as lookouts for the local
dealers. A student once belittled Salcedos teaching salary while bragging
he was on his way to the local Volvo dealer to buy a car.
In his other life as a reserve naval intelligence officer who had
brief stints in Colombia, Salcedo was privy to classified information on the
source of so much misery back home -- the Colombian coca trade. Even with that
experience, Salcedo thinks that the recent moves to increase military aid to
Colombia to fight the drug war is a huge mistake. In a recent telephone
interview, Salcedo noted that as early as 1986-87, you could see
the amount of ... [drug] traffic pouring out of Colombia. Given his
extensive experience as a warrior in the war on drugs (he also spent
two-and-a-half years as a member of the Pentagons Joint Task Force Six,
which coordinates interagency counter-drug efforts) Salcedo sees the U.S.
governments latest push to squash the drug supply, a two-year $1.7
billion aid package for the Colombian military, as a ridiculous
waste of time and money.
The house is burning Salcedo said, referring to the
detrimental effects 14 million drug users (including 4 million hardcore drug
addicts) have on Americas social fabric. Figures from the White House
Office on National Drug Control Policy support his point. The crime, illness
and lost worker productivity due to the drug scourge cost the United States
some $110 billion annually. But in Salcedos eyes, the Clinton
administrations plan to send 45 helicopters (including 30 Black Hawks)
and other military equipment to Colombia is akin to pointing the fire hose in
the wrong direction. Supply will always meet demand, he believes, so the answer
to the problem is not in Colombia, but on the streets of America. After having
seen so many young lives get way off track before they even begin, Salcedo
believes that focusing anti-drug efforts on the supplier misses the point. The
House on March 31 approved a spending bill that included $1.7 billion in
military aid for Colombia. Congressional sources said they expect the Senate to
take up the Colombia aid package not as part of a broad spending measure but as
part of the normal appropriations process. The body was expected to approve a
measure similar to that passed by the House sometime in May.
Late last year the Clinton administration reversed a three-year
policy of denying funds to supply advanced Black Hawk helicopters to Colombia.
Not only was there an about-face, but the administration took up the cause of
drug interdiction in Colombia with unusual zeal. In addition to the
helicopters, the governments plan also includes the creation and training
of two new anti-drug battalions, 15 spray aircraft for crop eradication,
upgrades to early warning and ground-attack aircraft, supplies, spare parts,
training, air- and ground-based radars and a host of other equipment.
In all, the United States will spend more on drug interdiction in
Colombia this year than it has in the last five years combined.
It is a dramatic shift in policy. Since 1996, the administration
had infuriated Congressional leaders over the question of sending the $13
million Black Hawk to fight the Colombian drug traffickers because of cost
concerns. While the Black Hawk, which is manufactured at a Sikorsky (a division
of United Technologies) plant in Connecticut, is more capable than the Vietnam
War-era Huey currently in service there, it is also six times the price and is
more costly to maintain. Further, the Colombian military would have to be
trained to fly the transport aircraft, which would not only add to the cost but
would take up to 18 months. The administration had also argued that since Huey
helicopters were only $2 million each, the United States could maintain drug
interdiction efforts in all the Andean nations.
But new figures on Colombias growing prominence in the drug
trade gave pause to policy planners at the White House. In an intelligence
report released by the CIA in February, the amount of land devoted to coca
cultivation in Colombia more than doubled over the past five years to 300,000
acres. Moreover, potential cocaine production skyrocketed in the same period
from 230 metric tons in 1995 to 520 metric tons in 1999. And with increasing
lobby pressure from the helicopter manufacturers to supply aircraft to the
Colombian military, and an angry Republican Party looking for a hot campaign
issue in an election year, the Clinton administration went on the offensive by
crafting a plan even the Republicans could love.
Unfortunately, it is unclear that the huge influx of American
technology will make much of a difference in the supply of drugs to communities
like Roxbury. The area to be covered by the 30 Black Hawk helicopters, the
Putumayo region of southern Colombia, is immense and comprised of thick jungle
where it is easy to hide drug production facilities. From a tactical
standpoint, Salcedo does not think there is much chance of success in Colombia.
For example, he said the drug traffickers are light years ahead of the
law enforcement net. They read the papers like everyone else, he said.
They know where the helicopters will be, how far they can fly and how
often and by accounting for those capabilities can continue to conduct
their narcotics operations. Its not rocket science, he
said.
Moreover, despite massive amounts of money and personnel being
thrown at the drug problem over the last decade, success has been elusive.
According to a July 1999, General Accounting Office report, federal spending on
drug control efforts has risen by nearly 50 percent during the
1990s to $18 billion. Further, the staff of the Drug Enforcement Agency,
the department assigned the task of cutting the drug supply entering the
country, has grown from 6,000 in 1990 to 8,400 in 1998. Sadly, the
accounting office study also noted that the enforcement agency has not
developed measurable performance targets for its programs and
therefore it is difficult to assess how successful DEAs programs
have been in reducing the supply of illegal drugs into the United
States.
In fact, despite the billions being spent to fight the drug
problem, the cost of cocaine in the United States actually declined during the
last decade from $246 per pure gram in 1990 to $169 per gram in 1998, according
to the Drug Enforcement Agency. And some members of Congress have noticed the
disappointing results. In a speech on the House floor on Feb. 16, Jim McGovern,
D-Mass., questioned the logic of spending even more money in Colombia, a
country that already receives the third highest amount of U.S. foreign aid
($300 million) annually, when that assistance has not produced the expected
outcome. Our current policy ... has not, McGovern said,
reduced coca cultivation ... the flow of cocaine or heroin to the U.S.
from Colombia or the profits of drug traffickers. Why do we believe that more
of the same is better?
Some critics believe that because the governments new aid
program has no criteria to measure success, it too will become an expensive
effort that will ultimately fail. There are no benchmarks, that
allow the administration to determine progress, according to Adam Isacson, a
Latin America analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. To
underscore the point, in the White House fact sheet describing the proposed aid
plan, components of the package are discussed -- indicating how the
money will be used -- but nowhere is the word goals used to reveal how
the government knows when a breakthrough has been achieved.
Yet another lingering fear about the U.S. aid plan is the
possibility of mission creep -- a situation where events on the ground force
the United States to expand or extend its involvement. As it stands, the U.S.
aid effort merely will enable Colombian forces to actively engage the
cocaine industry at its center of gravity, according to the White House
fact sheet. No American forces will be allowed to join the Colombians on
missions intended to engage the drug traffickers, Pentagon officials assured a
House panel in February. But the issue is not as simple as it appears.
Not only is this a drug interdiction effort, but because the
traffickers and members of the so-called FARC rebel group work together -- the
traffickers grow, process and ship drugs while the guerillas provide protection
for a fee -- fears abound that the drug interdiction effort could turn into an
anti-insurgency campaign as well. The Clinton administration did itself no
favor when it touted its assistance package as a push into the coca
growing regions of southern Colombia, which are now dominated by insurgent
guerillas.
Given that the Colombian military has tussled with the rebels for
40 years and that the FARC has greatly improved its war-fighting capability
with funds generated from the drug trade, the dreaded word quagmire has
seeped into discussions about the aid package.
During a Feb. 24 hearing on the drug plan, Senate Appropriations
Committee Chairman Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, voiced the concerns of many when he
asked the head of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Who
goes in if this thing blows up? Tell me this is not Vietnam again, he
said. Rep. McGovern also raised the issue during his floor statement in mid
February when he noted that it would take almost two years for all the Black
Hawks to be built and delivered to Colombia. Are we going to be in
Colombia for just two years, he asked, or who knows how many
years? And Isacson of the Center for International Policy went even
further when he registered his belief that the Clinton administration plan
is Step 1 in a longer process for the U.S. Indeed, Washington
insiders are beginning to say that the present plan could turn into a
commitment lasting five years or more.
The questions remain: If the government continues to dump billions
of dollars into Colombia, what becomes of the kids in places like Theodore
Roosevelt Middle School in Roxbury? Will another generation of
junior-high-school-age kids get sucked into a life of drugs and crime? History
has shown that despite the name, the war on drugs isnt being
won with military equipment. The drug cartels, like the Viet Cong, adapt easily
to changing conditions. When U.S. aid made it difficult for narcotics
traffickers to operate in Bolivia and Peru, they moved their operations to
Colombia. And, as Sylvester Salcedo points out, if the current effort in
Colombia has an impact on production, the cartels will move their operations to
Venezuela or Panama. To the runners, dealers and addicts back in the states, it
doesnt much matter where the cocaine comes from.
Thomas Cardamone is a project director for the Council For A
Livable World Education Fund in Washington.
National Catholic Reporter, April 14,
2000
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